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Recent Developments 
Muir v. State: CLARIFYING 
PREDICATE CRIMES OF 
VIOLENCE UNDER MARYLAND'S 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT 
STATUTE. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
cently decided in Muir v. State, 308 Md. 
208, 517 A.2d 1105 (1986), that convic-
tions of robbery and attempted robbery by 
a general court-martial tribunal of the 
United States Army may be considered as 
predicate crimes of violence under Md. 
Ann. Code art. 27 § 643B (1982 Repl. 
Vol., 1985 Cum. Supp.). 
Gary Michael Muir pleaded guilty be-
fore a general court-martial in 1969 of two 
separate robberies and one attempted rob-
bery of three different soldiers; each of-
fense involved the use of a knife. He was 
sentenced to three years' imprisonment in 
a military prison. Muir was then seventeen 
years old and a soldier in the U.S. Army. 
Subsequently, he was convicted of second 
degree rape in the Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County for which he served a pe-
riod of imprisonment. 
Maryland's enhanced punishment statute 
for repeat offenders, Article 27, § 643B re-
quires, in subsection (c), the imposition of 
a mandatory sentence of not less than 
twenty-five years upon any person who, 
under specified conditions, is convicted a 
third time of a "crime of violence."' Sub-
section (a) of the statute defines a "crime of 
violence."2 
In the present case, Muir was convicted 
in the Circuit Court for Prince George's 
County of attempted first and second de-
gree sexual offenses, burglary, and assault 
with intent to disable. At sentencing, evi-
dence was adduced of his earlier court-mar-
tial and rape convictions for the purpose of 
enhancing the sentence under § 643B. 
Acting under the statute, the trial judge 
sentenced Muir to life imprisonment with-
out the possibility of parole on the count 
charging attempted first degree sexual of-
fense. 
On certiorari review before the court of 
appeals, Muir argued that his court-mar-
tial convictions for crimes of violence 
could not be deemed qualifying predicate 
offenses under § 643B because of the exist-
ing procedural and substantive differences 
between the civil and military justice sys-
terns. Muir also contended that in view of 
his age in 1969, the court-martial convic-
tions should be viewed under Maryland 
law only as juvenile offenses, not as crimes, 
and are therefore precluded from consid-
eration in determining the applicability of 
§ 643B(c). 
In holding that court-martial convictions 
may be considered predicate crimes of vio-
lence under § 643B, the court stated that 
the purpose of § 643B "is to protect the 
public from assaults upon people and in-
jury to property and to deter repeat of-
fenders from perpetrating other criminal 
acts of violence under the threat of an ex-
tended period of confinement." 308 Md. 
at 214, 517 A.2d at 1108. 
The Muir court also noted that the statute 
has been afforded broad application to per-
sons convicted a third time of a crime of 
violence. For example, equivalent convic-
tions in jurisdictions outside of Maryland 
of crimes of violence within the ambit of 
§ 643(a) may be considered as predicate 
offenses for purposes of sentencing under 
the statute's provisions. See, Temoney v. 
State, 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 
( 1981 )_; Dibartolomeo v. State, 61 Md. 
App. 302, 486 A.2d 256 ( 1985). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland con-
ceded that there are many differences be-
tween the systems of military and civilian 
justice. However, the court found per-
suasive the opinion of the Supreme Court 
in Burns v. Richardson, 346 U.S. 137 
( 1953), wherein it was noted that "military 
courts, like state courts, have the same 
responsibilities as do the federal courts to 
protect a person from a violation of his 
constitutional rights." 346 U.S. at 142. 
The Burns court further observed that 
through the then recently completed revi-
sion of the Articles ofWar, and the estab-
lishment of a Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, Congress "has taken great care to 
define the rights of those subject to military 
law, and to provide a complete system of 
review within the military system to secure 
those rights." 346 U.S. at 142. 
Many of the rights afforded an accused 
under the military justice system were out-
lined in Burns. These include: ( 1) a trial as 
free as possible from command influence; 
(2) the right to prompt arraignment; (3) the 
right to counsel of the accused's own choos-
ing; and (4) the right to secure witnesses 
and prepare an adequate defense. 
The court of appeals briefly addressed 
Muir's contention that because he would 
have been deemed a juvenile had he com-
mitted the offenses as a civilian in Mary-
land, these offenses should not be consid-
ered as predicated offenses under§ 643B(a). 
The court stated that omitting these con-
victions as predicate crimes of violence 
would thwart the legislative purpose of 
protecting the public and deterring the 
commission of violent offenses. 308 Md. 
at 218,517 A.2a at 1110. 
Thus, the present case is significant be-
cause it clarifies, and perhaps broadens, 
the types of offenses which are applicable 
in Maryland as predicate crimes of vio-
lence under § 643B. Offenders are now on 
notice that previous general court-martial 
convictions, regardless of the age of the 
convicted, may be used to enhance punish-
ment under the Maryland statute. 
- Jenmfer Crump 
Notes 
'Subsection (c) provides, in part: 
"Any person who (I) has been convicted on 
two separate occasions of a crime of violence 
where the convictions do not arise from a single 
incident, and (2) has served at least one term 
of confinement in a correctional institution as 
a result of a conviction of a crime of violence, 
shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third 
time of a crime of violence, to imprisonment 
for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, 
not less than 25 years." 
2Subsection (a) defines "crimes of violence" to mean: 
"abduction; arson; burglary; daytime house-
breaking under § 30 (b) of this Article; kid-
napping; manslaughter, except involuntary 
manslaughter; mayhem and maiming under 
§ § 384, 385 and 386 of this article; murder; 
rape; robbery; robbery with a deadly weapon; 
sexual offense in the first degree; sexual of-
fense in the second degree; use of a handgun 
in the commission of a felony or other crime 
of violence; an attempt to commit any of the 
aforesaid offenses; assault with intent to 
murder; and assault with intent to rape." 
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